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1 Introduction
Given that regulation has become a pervasive feature of most markets, uncertainty about
changes in regulatory environments is a major operating concern for firms. Indeed surveys
on business risks (e.g. EUI 2005, Ernst&Young 2008, 2010, Allianz 2015) consistently rank
this uncertainty as one of the main risks for businesses. Highlighting the active role that
political institutions have in managing regulatory risk, Ernst&Young (2010, p.10) emphasizes
that “governments need to move fast to remove uncertainty”.
Consequently, this paper studies the question whether political parties have both an inher-
ent incentive and the means to reduce regulatory risk, or whether modern political systems
exhibit some perverse incentive that prevents them for doing so or even encourages them to
artificially impose regulatory risk. The paper formally shows that, for monopoly regulation,
political parties have indeed incentives to remove politically induced regulatory risk through
political bargaining. It, moreover, argues that they can eliminate such risk by institutional-
izing independent regulatory agencies. The paper therefore offers a new explanation for the
prevalence of such agencies: their ability to limit regulatory risk. As discussed in Section 8,
this empirical implication matches well the shaping of, for instance, the US Postal Regulatory
Commission (PRC) as an independent regulatory agency.
Theoretical results are obtained in the regulation framework of Baron and Myerson (1982),
where a benevolent government regulates a privately informed monopolist with the objective
to maximize a weighted sum of consumer surplus and profits. I embed this framework in a
political economy setup, where two political parties differ in their views about the appropriate
weight on profits. These different political views cause a preference for different regulated
output schedules. Hence, when election outcomes are random, the firm’s output is random and
this signifies the regulatory risk.
In order to evaluate the parties’ risk attitudes towards this risk, I compare their expected
payoffs with and without regulatory risk. This comparison reveals that regulatory risk affects
political parties through two effects: a fluctuation and an output-expansion effect. These two
effects follow directly from the fact that under regulatory risk the firm’s output is random.
Intuitively, the fluctuation effect represents the variance of this randomness, while the output-
expansion effect is linked to the output’s mean under the randomness.
Because consumers have a decreasing marginal utility in consumption, they dislike any
variance in the firm’s output so that the fluctuation effect affects consumer surplus adversely.
Hence, the fluctuation effect also hurts political parties that put positive weight on consumer
surplus.
In contrast, a party’s attitude towards the output expansion effect is more subtle. The
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expansion effect expresses whether the firm’s regulated output is, in expectation, larger or
smaller than in the absence of the randomness. Depending on the convexity of the consumer’s
demand function, the output expansion effect can be positive or negative. If the expansion is
positive, then it benefits the party that puts more weights on profits, while it hurts the other
party. If the expansion effect is negative, these effects are reversed. Hence, exactly one party
likes the expansion effect, while the other party dislikes it.
Taking both the fluctuation and expansion effect into consideration, it follows that at least
one party unambiguously dislikes regulatory risk, whilst the other party dislikes regulatory risk
only when the fluctuation effect outweighs the expansion effect. As I show this is the case when
the party’s winning probability is large or the overall degree of political divergence is small.
In order to study the link between regulatory risk and the independence of regulatory
agencies, I next consider the parties’ incentive to delegate the regulatory task to a regulatory
agency. In particular, I allow parties to bargain about the agency’s appropriate objective before
the election, but with the outside option that if the pre-electoral bargaining breaks down, the
party who wins the election chooses the agency’s objective. I obtain that, regardless of the
parties’ attitudes towards regulatory risk, any Pareto efficient bargaining outcome eliminates all
regulatory risk. Efficient bargaining therefore induces parties to institutionalize an independent
regulatory agency whose objective is independent of the election outcome. This eliminates all
regulatory risk and establishes the main insight of this paper: Benevolent political parties,
who differ in the relative emphasis they put on consumer surplus versus profits, have a natural
incentive to reduce rather than increase regulatory risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related literature.
Section 3 sets up the framework and characterizes the comparative statics of the optimal regu-
lation contract. Section 4 shows that electoral uncertainty without political bargaining induces
regulatory risk. Section 5 analyzes the attitudes of political parties towards this risk, while
Section 6 studies their incentives in eliminating it through political bargaining. Introducing
political competition, Section 7 considers endogenous election outcomes. Section 8 illustrates
that the theoretical insights help to understand how independent regulatory agencies are shaped
in practise by discussing regulation of the US postal system. The paper closes with a discussion
about the paper’s theoretical results in Section 9. For those propositions that do not follow
directly from the text, formal proofs are collected in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
The paper’s focus on the effect of electoral uncertainty on optimal regulation relates it to
the literature on the political economy of regulation. In particular, Baron (1988) studies how
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the political framework affects regulatory outcomes. Because there is no electoral uncertainty,
Baron (1988) does however not exhibit regulatory risk. Introducing electoral uncertainty explic-
itly, Laffont (1996), Boyer and Laffont (1999), and also Laffont (2000) point out that politically
controlled regulation leads to regulation outcomes that fluctuate with the uncertain election
outcome. These fluctuations imply regulatory risk. The studies point out that fluctuations
are excessive from an overall welfare perspective and, subsequently, study the welfare effects of
reducing fluctuations by limiting the discretionary power of political parties. In contrast to this
welfare orientated approach, the current paper provides a more positive analysis and shows that
the political parties themselves have already incentives and ways to limit these fluctuations.
Because this former literature abstracts from this possibility, this paper’s results suggest that
the negative welfare effects of fluctuations are less severe than these earlier studies indicate.
More generally, this paper is an illustration of the general insight in political science that,
due to political uncertainty, politicians may benefit from smoothening fluctuations in polit-
ical decision making. This smoothing motive is, next to the insulation motive, one of the
main rationales for delegating political decisions to independent bureaucracies.1 In particular,
Fiorina (1982) provides an explicit analysis of the smoothing motive, demonstrating that the
risk preferences of political actors is its main driver. He thereby implicitly criticizes that the
smoothing motive “takes us willy-nilly into the realm of functional forms (Fiorina p.57, 1982)”.
By explicitly modeling the regulatory problem that underlies the political decision, this paper
addresses this criticism by providing a micro foundation of these functional forms.2 An addi-
tional advantage of the micro foundation is that it yields new and more concrete insights in the
potential benefits of the smoothing motive – the fluctuation and the output-expansion effect,
which can then be related directly to economic fundamentals such as the underlying demand
conditions.
In contrast, the insulation motive expresses the incentive of an incumbent political party
to insulate its policies against changes by opponents that come to power in the future. For
example, Moe (1990, p.229) argues that political uncertainty induces current public authority
holders to use delegation as “protective devices for insulating agencies from political enemies”.
In this vein, Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2003) show in an economic environment how an
incumbent government benefits from politically independent agencies in order to insulate its
1Protection against dynamic inconsistent behavior (e.g., Kydland and Prescott 1977; Rogoff 1985) provides
a further strategic rationale for delegating power to independent bureaucracies, but is also not linked to political
uncertainty or fluctuations in political control.
2See also de Figueiredo (2002), who investigates a model with political uncertainty where the parties’ payoff
functions are, by assumption, single-peaked and concave, implying risk averse behavior with respect to the
one–dimensional policy variable.
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policies against changes by differently minded politicians in the future. Although also the
insulation motive favors commitment through delegation, this motive is not directly related to
electorial uncertainty or regulatory risk. To see this, note that the insulation motive is strongest
if the governing party is certain to lose the next election – i.e., when there is no risk; and the
motive is weakened if there is electoral uncertainty so that the change is less certain. Hence,
the insulation motive is related to electoral change rather than electoral risk. While both the
insulation motive and regulatory risk are two possible drivers of delegation, the regulatory risk
motive yields a more benign hypothesis for independent regulatory agencies.
The current paper also abstracts from any collusion possibilities of regulators. This allows
it to show that already without collusion the trade–offs concerning political independence is
nontrivial and economically relevant. It therefore differs from, for example, Faure-Grimaud and
Martimort (2007), who explicitly focus on collusion and identify a positive stabilization effect
of independent regulators when these regulators are more prone to collusion than independent
ones.
Finally, the current paper is related to Strausz (2011), who develops a model of regulatory
risk of which a variant is used here. An important difference is however that Strausz (2011)
takes the degree of regulatory risk as exogenous and takes its source for granted. It moreover
analyzes the impact of the fluctuation and expansion effect on the regulated firm, the consumer,
and the regulator rather than some political party. In contrasts the current paper focuses on a
particular source of regulatory risk – politically induced regulatory risk – and investigates the
incentive of the responsible economic agents – political parties – to control this risk. It thereby
endogenizes the degree of regulatory risk.
3 The Setup
A privately informed monopolistic firm produces a publicly provided good x at constant marginal
costs c with no fixed costs. Hence, the firm’s profit from producing a quantity x for a lump–sum
transfer t is
Π(t, x|c) ≡ t− cx.
Marginal costs are cl with probability ν and ch with probability 1− ν, where ∆c ≡ ch − cl > 0.
Only the firm learns the realization of its marginal costs c. Its outside option is zero.
Consumers pay a lump–sum transfer t in exchange for the consumption of a quantity x, and
obtain a consumer surplus of
Ψ(t, x) ≡ v(x)− t.
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The term v(x) expresses the consumers’ overall utility from the consumption of a quantity x
of the good. It is increasing at a decreasing rate, i.e., v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0, and its third order
derivative, v′′′, determines the local curvature of the consumers’ aggregate demand function.3
Before regulation takes place, there is a general election between a party l and a party r.
The election determines the ruling party that runs the government and, ultimately, decides
about the regulation. Importantly, the election outcome is uncertain.4 It is instructive to first
take the level of electoral uncertainty as exogenous: party l wins the election with probability
π ∈ (0, 1) and party r wins it with probability 1 − π. Section 7 endogenizes the degree of
electoral uncertainty by introducing electoral competition.
Both parties are benevolent in that they maximize a weighted sum of consumer surplus and
profits. In line with the economic literature on partisan politics5, the parties attach different
weights to profits. These differences express the extent to which the two parties differ in their
perception of the appropriate weight α in society’s social choice function and the extent to
which they cater to the preferences of heterogeneous voter groups. In particular, party p’s
objective function is
Wp = Ψ+ αpΠ, (1)
where the parameter αp ∈ [0, 1) represents the weight of party p on profits. Party r has a more
business friendly orientation so that αr > αl. In summary, a firm that receives a transfer t and
produces a quantity x at marginal costs ci yields party p ∈ {l, r} a payoff of
Wp(x, t, ci) ≡ Ψ(x, t) + αpΠ(x, t) = v(x)− αpcix+ (1− αp)t.
The triple (π, αl, αr) describes the political system. For a given political system, let ∆α ≡
αr − αl > 0 represent the political divergence of the system.
Following Baron (1988), the government delegates the regulatory task to a regulatory agency
by endowing the agency with a specific objective function:
Wa = Ψ(x, t) + αaΠ(x, t).
Hence, the government’s decision is the weight αa with which the agency is to regulate.
3The consumer’s demand x(p) solves maxx v(x)−px and satisfies the first order condition v
′(x(p)) = p. By the
implicit function theorem, differentiating twice and rearranging terms yields x′′(p) = −v′′′(x(p))x′(p)2/v′′(x(p)).
Due to v′′ < 0, the sign of v′′′ fully determines the curvature of demand.
4Moe (1990, p228, footnote 16) notes ”political uncertainty is absolutely fundamental to the public sector”.
5E.g., Baron (1988), Boyer and Laffont (1999), Laffont (2000), Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2003) and
Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2007)
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The paper concentrates on the following political game Γ:
t = 0 : Parties may agree on institutionalizing an agency with a weight αa ∈ [0, 1] on profits.
t = 1 : Nature determines the election winner p ∈ {l, r}.
t = 2 : Without agreement in t = 0, the election winner chooses the agency’s weight αa.
t = 3 : The agency offers the firm a regulatory schedule.
Consequently, the only task of the agency is to propose a regulatory schedule to the firm.
In particular, the agency does not engage in information acquisition or any other productive
task. This limited role of the agency makes explicit that the incentives of the political parties
whether to grant political independence is driven entirely by considerations of regulatory risk
rather than other concerns such as information acquisition or collusion.
Given a specific weight αa, the agency offers a regulatory schedule that is optimal given its
objective function Wa. By the revelation principle, the optimal regulation contract is a direct




νWa(xl, tl, cl) + (1− ν)Wa(xh, th, ch) (2)
s.t. th − chxh ≥ tl − chxl and tl − clxl ≥ th − clxh;
tl ≥ clxl and th ≥ chxh.
Standard arguments imply that the incentive compatibility of the efficient firm cl and the
individual rationality constraint of the inefficient firm ch are binding. Consequently, given a
schedule (xl, xh) the optimal transfers are t̂h(xl, xh) ≡ chxh and t̂l(xl, xh) ≡ clxl +∆cxh. Using
these expressions to substitute out the binding constraints leads to the following first order
conditions that characterize the optimal quantity schedules (x̂l, x̂h):
v′(x̂l) = cl and v
′(x̂h) = ch + (1− αa)ψ∆c, (3)
where ψ ≡ ν/(1 − ν). Hence, the usual result obtains that the allocation of the efficient type
coincides with the first best and the allocation of the inefficient type is distorted downwards.
Party p’s payoff from a schedule (x̂l, x̂h(αa)) is W̃p(x̂l, x̂h(αa)), where
W̃p(xl, xh) ≡ νWp(xl, t̂l(xh, xl), cl) + (1− ν)Wp(xh, t̂h(xh, xl), ch).










The first expression is, due to v′′ < 0, positive and, therefore, x̂h(αl) ≤ x̂h(αr) ≤ x
fb
h . The
more business friendly party r asks the firm to produce more, because it discounts less the
information rent that is required with higher production. The second expression reiterates
one of the main findings in Strausz (2011) that the curvature of demand, v′′′, determines the
curvature of x̂h with respect to αa.
4 Politically Induced Regulatory Risk
Consider as a benchmark the political game Γ without the pre-electoral bargaining stage t = 0
so that in stage t = 2 the winning party simply chooses the agency’s weight αa. Because a
weight αa leads to a production xl = x̂l in case of an efficient firm and xh = x̂h(αa) in case of
an inefficient firm, the choice αa in t = 2 yields party p the expected payoff
Ŵp(αa) ≡ W̃p(x̂l, x̂h(αa)). (5)
The following lemma confirms the intuitive but helpful property that Ŵp is single–peaked and
attains a maximum at αp.
Lemma 1 The function Ŵp is increasing for α < αp and decreasing for α > αp. It attains a
unique maximum at αp so that Ŵ
′
p(αp) = 0 and Ŵ
′′
p (αp) < 0.
From the lemma, it then follows that it is best for a ruling party p to endow the agency with
its own weight αp. This means that production fluctuates with the election outcome, because
if party l wins, the inefficient firm ends up producing xh(αl), while it produces xh(αr) when
party r wins. In the presence of uncertain election outcomes, this leads to politically induced
regulatory risk.
Proposition 1 Without pre-electoral bargaining, regulatory risk results and a party p obtains
the pre-electoral expected payoff of
W ep ≡ πŴp(αl) + (1− π)Ŵp(αr). (6)
The rest of the paper investigates the attitudes of the political parties towards this risk and
their incentives to negotiate it away in period t = 0.
5 Risk Attitudes
This section investigates the party’s risk attitude towards politically induced regulatory risk
by following the idea that the risky election outcome — weight αl with probability π and αr
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with probability (1−π) — is, in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), a mean preserving
spread of the deterministic expected weight
αe ≡ παl + (1− π)αr.
Hence, in line with classical risk analysis, a political party dislikes regulatory risk when its





If the inequality is reversed, a party, in contrast, likes regulatory risk. Hence, the curvature of
Ŵp determines party p’s attitude towards risk. In particular, party p dislikes regulatory risk,
when its payoff Ŵp is concave in α, whereas it likes the risk if its payoff is convex. The following
lemma establishes a sufficient condition under which a party’s payoff Ŵp is locally concave.





When the local condition (8) holds globally, the function Ŵp(α) is concave globally, which
implies that party p dislikes regulatory risk in general. Because the expected policy preference
αe lies in between αl and αr, the relevant interval for considering the curvature of Ŵp(α) is
[αl, αr] rather than the overall domain [0, 1]. For α ∈ [αl, αr], all the signs of the different terms
in (8) are unambiguously determined except for v′′′, which represents the curvature of demand.
The following proposition states the extent to which risk attitudes depend on this curvature.
Proposition 2 For linear demand (v′′′ = 0), both parties dislike regulatory risk. When demand
is globally convex (v′′′ > 0), party l dislikes regulatory risk. When demand is globally concave
(v′′′ < 0), party r dislikes regulatory risk.
In order to understand the intuition behind Proposition 2, it is helpful to decompose the
overall effect of regulatory risk in an expansion effect and a fluctuation effect.
First recall the result at the end of Section 3 that the curvature of demand, v′′′, determines
the curvature of x̂h with respect to αa. In particular, the output x̂h is convex in αa when the
consumer’s demand is convex and vice versa. Hence, if one compares the allocation x̂ at the
expected weight αe to the expected output under regulatory risk
x̂eh ≡ πx̂h(αl) + (1− π)x̂h(αr),
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Concave demand v′′′ < 0
α
αl αrα̃
l likes riskl dislikes risk
Ŵl(α)
Ŵr(α)
Convex demand v′′′ > 0
α
αl αrα̃
r likes risk r dislikes risk
Ŵl(α)
Ŵr(α)
Figure 1: Payoff effects of regulatory risk
then, under convex demand, x̂eh ≥ x̂(αe). This means that regulatory risk has a positive
expansion effect on output when demand is convex. For concave demand, it follows x̂eh ≤ x̂(αe)
so that the expansion effect of regulatory risk is negative. For linear demand, x̂eh and x̂(αe)
coincide; regulatory risk has no expansion effect.
To understand the fluctuation effect of regulatory risk, consider first the case of linear
demand where there is no expansion effect: x̂eh = x̂h(αe). In this case, regulatory risk has only
a fluctuation effect in that, with regulatory risk, output fluctuates between x̂h(αl) and x̂h(αr),
whereas without regulatory risk it is fixed at its expected value x̂h(αe) = x
e
h. Because of the
consumers’ decreasing marginal utility, the two parties dislike such fluctuations. This explains
the statement of Proposition 2 that, with linear demand, both parties dislike regulatory risk.
Now if demand is convex, then the expansion effect is positive so that regulatory risk raises
the expected value of the output itself. From the perspective of party l, regulatory risk therefore
moves the expected allocation x̂eh further from its ideal output x̂h(αl) so that the expansion
effect hurts party l. Given that also the fluctuation effect is negative, the two effects reinforce
each other and, therefore, party l unambiguously dislikes regulatory risk. This explains the
second statement of Proposition 2 that, with convex demand, party l dislikes regulatory risk.
In contrast, a positive expansion effect has a positive effect on party r, because it moves the
expected output x̂eh closer to its ideal value x̂h(αr). Hence, from party r’s perspective, a positive
output expansion effect counteracts the fluctuation effect. If the former is strong enough, party
r actually likes regulatory risk. The opposite logic holds when the expansion effect is negative
so that output contracts.
Figure 1 illustrates the role of curvature further. When demand is concave (v′′′ < 0),
10
condition (8) is, due to the output contraction effect, satisfied for any α < αp. This implies
that the curve Ŵp is concave for all weights α that are smaller than the party’s ideal weight
αp. As illustrated in the first graph of Figure 1, this implies for party r that its payoff function
Ŵr is concave for the entire range [αl, αr]. For α > αp, a party p benefits from the output
contraction effect and, for α large enough, condition (8) is violated. As illustrated in the first
graph of Figure 1, this implies that there exist a range of [α̃, αr] such that party l benefits from
regulatory risk.
Proposition 2 gives a definite answer about risk preferences for demand functions that are
either globally convex or globally concave. It is, however, uninformative about risk preferences
for demand curves with a changing curvature. For such demand functions, the local effect of
regulatory risk can change over the relevant domain [αl, αr] and one has to consider the overall
global effect of regulatory risk directly. The following proposition extends the previous one
in that it shows that, independent of the demand curve, at least one political party dislikes
regulatory risk.
Proposition 3 In any political system (π, αl, αr), at least one political party dislikes regulatory
risk. If the expansion effect is positive (x̂eh ≥ x̂h(αe)), then party l dislikes regulatory risk. If
the expansion effect is negative (x̂eh ≤ x̂h(αe)), then party r dislikes regulatory risk.
In the light of the intuition behind Proposition 2, the reasoning behind Proposition 3 is
straightforward. As argued, the fluctuation effect impacts the political parties negatively. A
positive expansion effect, therefore, reinforces party l’s dislike of the fluctuation effect so that
this party dislikes regulatory risk. Similarly, a negative expansion effect reinforces the negative
impact of the fluctuation effect of party r. Because, the expansion effect is either positive,
negative, or zero, there is at least one party for whom the negative impact of the fluctuation
effect is (weakly) reinforced by the expansion effect. As a consequence, at least one political
party dislikes regulatory risk.
Proposition 3 reveals that at least one party dislikes regulatory risk, but Figure 1 illustrates
that the other party may or may not like it. Using Lemma 2 one may characterize political
systems in which both parties dislike regulatory risk. Defining a political system as risk averse






the following comparative static results obtain.
Proposition 4 A political system (π, αl, αr) is averse to regulatory risk whenever
6If v′′′(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, x̂h(1)], then let v̄ = ∞.
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i) political divergence ∆α is small and, in particular, smaller than v̄/(ψ∆c);
ii) the winning probability of the regulatory risk averse party is small enough;
iii) the difference in costs ∆c is small and, in particular, smaller than v̄/(ψ∆α);
iv) the probability of an efficient firm, ν, is small and, in particular, smaller than v̄/(v̄ +
∆α∆c).
To understand the first result of the proposition, note that, because the curve Ŵp(α) reaches
its maximum at αp, it is strictly concave around αp. By continuity it then follows that, a party’s
objective function Ŵp(α) is concave for weights α close to the party’s ideal weight αp. The first
result, therefore, follows from the observation that a party’s payoff must be concave over the
whole range [αl, αr] when this range is small.
The second result shows that a sufficient condition for a political system to be averse to
regulatory risk is that the party which may potentially like regulatory risk is likely enough to
win. At first sight this seems surprising, but the result follows again from the observation that
the curve Ŵp is necessarily concave around αp. When party p has a high enough probability of
winning then this implies that the expected αe lies close to αp and the curve Ŵp is, therefore,
also concave in the neighborhood of αe. This explains that, irrespective of the expansion effect,
a party necessarily dislikes regulatory risk, when its probability of winning is high enough.
The economic intuition behind the last two results of Proposition 4 follows from consid-
ering the fundamentals of the regulation problem. When ∆c or ν become small, the private
information problem disappears and information rents become irrelevant. Because the parties
differ only in the way they evaluate these information rents, these differences disappear when
the private information problem becomes negligible.
6 Political Bargaining and Independent Regulators
When the political system is averse to regulatory risk, parties benefit from fully eliminating
it by institutionalizing a politically independent agency that attaches the weight αe to profits.
Hence, for such systems, one may expect regulatory risk not to occur.
For political systems that are not averse to regulatory risk, at least one party loses from
institutionalizing an agency with the weight αe. In this case, the parties may try to reach a
mutual beneficial agreement on another weight αa, meaning that with the possibility of pre-
electoral agreements an exclusive focus on the average weight αe is too limited. Moreover,




















Figure 2: Non-Pareto (αl1, α
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a) with the interpretation that when party p wins the election, the regulatory
agency regulates on the basis of the weight αpa. Such conditional pre-electoral agreements are
more general since they comprise the unconditional ones (i.e. set αla = α
r
a = αa).
Whenever political parties agree on a pair with αla 6= α
r
a, the resulting agreement does not
fully eliminate regulatory risk, since the output schedule which the agency implements still
depends non-trivially on the election outcome. This section shows that, even if parties have
diverging risk attitudes, they have an incentive to fully eliminate regulatory risk, i.e. choose
αla = α
r
a, rather than to reduce it only partially (or even to increase it).
In order to demonstrate this result, note that the pre-electoral expected payoff of party









a) + (1− π)Ŵp(α
r
a).
Consequently, define a pre-electoral agreement (αla, α
r
a) as Pareto optimal if there exists no


























with at least one strict inequality.
Figure 2 illustrates that Pareto optimal agreements can be characterized by using the stan-
dard techniques of indifference curves in consumer theory. Because of the differences in the
slopes of the indifference curves that go through a point off the 45-degree line, agreements
which do not eliminate all regulatory risk are not Pareto optimal. To make this observation










































Because the marginal rate of substitution expresses the slope of the indifference curve, an
indifference curve Ir associated with a point above the 45-degree line, where α
l < αr, is steeper
than its corresponding indifference curve Il. Hence, agreements that exhibit α
l < αr are not
Pareto optimal, since moving towards the 45-degree yields a Pareto improvement. Similarly
for pairs below the 45-degree line where αr < αl, the indifference Il is steeper than Ir so that
again moving closer to the 45-degree line yields a Pareto improvement. Pareto optimal pairs
are only found on the 45-degree line, where the marginal rates of substitution coincide. The
following lemma summarizes the result.







that in any political system, the efficient pre-electoral agreements fully eliminate politically in-
duced regulatory risk by institutionalizing an independent regulatory agency with a unconditional
weight αa.
According to the proposition, Pareto optimal agreements can be characterized by a single
unconditional αa ∈ [0, 1]. Recalling expressions (5) and (6) allows a characterization of agree-
ments that are also mutually beneficial to the parties. In particular, a politically independent










Because W ep lies in between Ŵp(αl) and Ŵp(αr) and Ŵp is continuous and monotone on the
interval [αl, αr], the value α
∗
p exists and is unique. Moreover, party l strictly prefers a politically
independent agency with a weight αa < α
∗
l to the risky default option, because Ŵl is decreasing
on [αl, αr]. Similarly, party r strictly prefers a politically independent agency with a weight
αa > α
∗




l so that both parties




l ). This reasoning
leads to the following result.
Proposition 6 In a political system (π, αl, αr), both parties benefit from institutionalizing a
politically independent agencies with weight αa ∈ A























Figure 3: Mutual beneficial unconditional pre–electoral agreements A∗
For a fixed αe, Figure 3 illustrates the construction of the proposition’s set A∗. The first
graph illustrates its construction in the case where both parties dislike regulatory risk, whereas
the second graph illustrates the case where one party actually likes regulatory risk. As illus-
trated, only in the former case it holds αe ∈ A∗.
7 Endogenous Election Probabilities
Investigating political uncertainty as the driver behind regulatory risk, the previous sections
treated this uncertainty as exogenously fixed. Such exogenous uncertainty can be taken as an
illustration of the extreme case where the main issues that interest voters are not primarily
related to the regulation problem. This section studies the other extreme, where voters are
only interested in the regulation outcome. This approach endogenizes the election outcome and,
moreover, enables to analyze the effect that political bargaining affects the winning probabilities
of the competing political parties. The previous analysis abstracted from this effect. The main
point of this section is to show that all qualitative results are robust to this additional effect.
A median voter model is used as a micro foundation for uncertain elections.7 In particular,
consider voters whose preferences differ only in one dimension: the weight α attached to profits.
The voters’ preferences concerning α are distributed according to the cumulative distribution
function F (α|s), where s describes the state of the world. When posting their platforms, the
political parties do not know the state s and are therefore ignorant of the exact distribution
7An alternative micro foundation for random election outcomes would be an electoral setup with costly
voting. E.g., Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) show that, for intermediate voting costs, the political economy
model exhibits a mixed equilibrium, where each individual randomizes concerning his decision whether to vote.
Because of its low analytical tractability of the mixed equilibrium, the current paper takes a different approach.
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of voters. To model this uncertainty explicitly, let G(s) describe the cumulative probability
distribution of s.
The timing of the political game with endogenous elections, Γe, is as follows:
t = 1 : Each party commits to a platform αp non–cooperatively.
t = 2 : Nature draws s and thereby determines the distribution of voters F (α|s).
t = 3 : Voters determine the winning party by majority vote.
t = 4 : The winning party p institutionalizes an agency with platform αp.
t = 5 : The agency offers the firm a regulatory contract.
In this one–dimensional voting model, the median voter theorem holds so that the median
voter determines the election outcome. The median voter rationally votes for the platform
closest to his own preferences. When the platforms are the same, he randomizes with probability
1/2. Because the political parties do not know the exact distribution of voters, they also do
not know the exact preferences of the median voter αm. Indeed, given platforms (αl, αr) the
probability that party l wins is
π = π(αl, αr) ≡ Pr{|αm − αl| < |αm − αr|}.
Consequently, the expected payoff of party p ∈ {l, h} is
Wp(α
p) = π(αl, αr)Ŵp(α
l) + (1− π(αl, αr))Ŵp(α
r). (12)
Given these payoff functions, the political parties simultaneously choose their platforms at stage
t = 1. The pair (α̂l, α̂r) forms a Nash equilibrium if α̂l is a best reply to α̂r and vice versa.
From the primitives G(s) and F (α|s) the cumulative probability distribution Gm(αm) ob-
tains, representing the probability that the median voter’s preferences do not exceed αm. Given









Pr{αm < (αl + αr)/2} = Gm((αl + αr)/2), if αl < αr
1/2, if αl = αm
Pr{αm > (αl + αr)/2} = 1−Gm((αl + αr)/2), if αl > αr.
Under the assumption that the density gm of Gm is continuous with support [0, 1], it follows
π(αl, αr) ∈ (0, 1) for all αl, αr ∈ (0, 1) and the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Any Nash equilibrium (α̂l, α̂r) exhibits αl < α̂
l < α̂r < αr.
The lemma shows that, due to the uncertainty about the preferences of the median voter, the
parties do not offer identical platforms. Hence, also the framework with political competition
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induces regulatory risk. The competition, however, reduces regulatory risk to some degree,
because |α̂l − α̂h| < |αl − αh|. More specifically, it leads to regulation on the basis of α̂
l with
probability π = F ((α̂l + α̂r)/2) and α̂r with probability 1− F ((α̂l + α̂r)/2).
From (12) it follows that the first order conditions
gm((α̂l + α̂r)/2)[Ŵl(α̂
l)− Ŵl(α̂





l)]/2 = (1−Gm((α̂l + α̂r)/2))Ŵ ′r(α̂
r),
characterize the Nash equilibrium (α̂l, α̂r).
Because regulatory risk persists in the presence of political competition, the question whether
the political parties have an incentive to reduce it through political bargaining remains relevant
also with political competition. Extending the political game Γe by an initial stage t = 0, where
parties can agree on installing some (partially) independent regulator with objectives (αla, α
r
a),
one may again study the question what kind of pairs (αla, α
r
a) the parties find mutually benefi-
cial, i.e. which yield either party more than its payoff in the original game Γe.
A first observation is that with respect to politically independent regulatory agencies all
previous results remain valid. To see this, suppose political agreement about a politically
independent regulatory agency αa changes the party l’s winning probability from π(α
l, αr) to
some π′. In this case, party p is better off from agreeing to αa than entering the political game
Γe exactly if αa satisfies
π(αl, αr)Ŵp(α
l) + (1− π(αl, αr))Ŵp(α
r) ≤ π′Ŵp(αa) + (1− π
′)Ŵp(αa) = Ŵp(αa).
For the specific case αa = α
e this inequality is identical to (7). It therefore follows that the
results of Section 5 concerning the risk attitudes towards regulatory risk extend to situations
where this risk is due to political competition rather than exogenous uncertainty. The reason
is that, although endogenous election outcomes generate the additional effect that winning
probabilities are no longer constant, this effect is irrelevant because by institutionalizing a
politically independent regulatory agency the parties are actually indifferent about who wins
the election.
The final step is to argue that also the results of Section 6 are robust to considering endoge-
nous election outcomes. Here the main result was that, independent of the political system,
Pareto optimal pre-electoral bargaining outcomes necessarily eliminate all regulatory risk. As










(αla − αl)(αr − α
r
a)
(αra − αl)(αr − α
l
a)
so that, again, only for αla = α
r
a the marginal rates of substitution coincide.
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8 An Illustration: The US Postal System
Using as a concrete example the US Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC), I illustrate the
extent to which this paper’s theoretical insights help to understand how regulatory agencies
are shaped in practise. Formerly called the Postal Rate Commission, the main task of the PRC
is to regulate the rates of the United States Postal Service (USPS), which has a government-
enforced monopoly on the delivery of first-class mail.
The PRC was created by the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 and was instrumental in
resolving the postal strike of 1970 that crippled the country to such an extent that President
Nixon had to declare a state of emergency and call in both the armed forces and the National
Guard to reinstate postal services.8 The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 abolished the then
United States Post Office Department, which, at the time, was one of the largest employers in
the world.9
Chaifetz (1971) explains that the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 was a direct response to
the smothering, close political control of both the US presidential cabinet and the US Congress.
Already the Kappel Report (1968), which formed the basis of the Act, attributed the failure of
the US Postal system mainly to the excessive political control. This control not only led to a
low working moral which culminated in the postal strike, but also expressed itself in politically
induced regulatory risk.
Before the Act, the head of the Postal Department, the Postmaster General, was a direct
member of the President’s cabinet and was appointed solely on the basis of political affiliation.
A change of political control typically led to a replacement of the Postmaster General.10 This
change in control closely reflects the politically induced regulatory risk as modelled in this
paper, because whenever a presidential election led to a president with a different political
affiliation, the Postmaster General changed and, thereby, the objectives of the organization.
Moreover, the postal rate was directly set by the US Congress through the Senate Committee
on Post Office and Civil Service.11 This second channel of political control opened the door for a
different source of politically induced regulatory risk: political favoritism and outright bribery.
For instance, in order to oppose a postal rate increase in 1967, the mail order catalogue company,
Spiegel Inc., illegally contributed to the campaign of a member of the Senate Committee on Post
Office and Civil Service.12 As the opportunities for political favors and bribery typically depend
on which politicians are elected, electoral uncertainty generates regulatory risk associated with
8See Nixon (1970a).
9See Kappel Report (1968) supra note 2, at 15.
10See Chaifetz (1971) page 1152.
11See Chaifetz (1971) page 1158-1159.
12United States v. Brewster (506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Welch (1989) page 1359-1362.
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political favoritism and bribery.
With the explicit goal of minimizing political control, the Act transformed the Post Office
from an executive department under direct political control to an independent establishment
of the executive branch.13 Consistent with the arguments in this paper, the main tool for safe-
guarding postal regulation from political influence was institutional: the creation of the Postal
Rate Commission as a politically-independent agency to which the US Congress delegated its
power to regulate postal rates.
Moreover, the Act followed after intense political bargaining between all political parties
involved as President Nixon himself stresses in his remarks on signing the Act: “We could not
have this measure had it not been for the bipartisan support, Democrats and Republicans,
working together for this reform legislation.”14 In line with the arguments in this paper, this
political bargaining explicitly involved the objective of the Postal system. Against the advice
of the Kappel Report (1968) to run the Post Office as a for-profit organization, it was agreed
upon that the Post Office continues its operation as a public service.15 In order to ensure a
politically balanced governance, the Act also explicitly specifies that of the PRC’s five members
no more than three may be of one political party.
Despite highly disruptive forces on the postal services such as the advance of the internet,
the institutional setup has proven remarkably stable. Since 1970 only a relatively minor reform
took place under the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006. This Act changed the
name from Postal Rate Commission to Postal Regulatory Commission and only strengthened
the Commission’s independence in regulating postal rates. The Act now explicitly requires the
Commission to develop and maintain regulations for a modern system of rate regulation. The
Act did not change the rule that no more than three of the Commissioners can be from any
one political party.
9 Conclusion
The analysis shows that, while political parties, in general, have conflicting attitudes towards
regulatory risk, they have a common interest in fully eliminating it. Consequently, the incentives
of the political system are in line with the concerns of practitioners to reduce uncertainty
as mentioned in the introduction. This also means that political parties have no interest in
exacerbating regulatory risk artificially. I conclude this section discussing possible limitations,
extensions, and applications of the results.
13See Chaifetz (1971) page 1159.
14See Nikon (1970b).
15See Chaifetz (1971) page 1160-1161.
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Commitment and Delegation
The analysis followed the literature on delegation in its assumption that political parties can
implement pre-electoral agreements by delegating the regulatory task to independent regulators
and commit not to replace them after the election. Even though the micro foundation under-
lying “commitment–by–delegation” is unclear, it has strong empirical and intuitive appeal.16
In the specific context of regulation, appropriate institutional arrangements strengthens
commitment by delegation.17 This is for example illustrated in the discussion of “regulatory
holidays” in the European fibre optic markets. Initiated by threats in 2006 to hold back on a 3
billion euro (US$3.86 billion) investment in ultra high-speed broadband network, the German
government initially exempted the Deutsche Telekom from regulation. In December 2009, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled against this regulatory holiday.18 In its judgement,
the ECJ clarifies that its ruling was driven by its concern that the imposition of a regulatory
holiday threatened the independence of national regulatory agencies.19 The official opinion of
the advocate general Poiares Maduroin states: “NRAs [national regulatory agencies] have been
set up and given particular powers by the Community regulatory framework for a reason: they
are expected to be insulated from certain interests and to reach their decisions governed only by
the criteria established in that framework.” Commission (2009) clarifies: “As the guardian of
the EC Treaty, the Commission has the option of commencing infringement proceedings, under
Article 226 of the EC Treaty, against a Member State, which in the eyes of the Commission
infringes Community law, in this case the Directives that make up the telecoms regulatory
framework.” Hence, in the European context an explicit, well established supranational frame-
work exists that safeguard the political independence of national regulatory agencies. Similarly
in the US, the federal government can safeguard the independence of regulatory agencies against
local state politics.
If institutional arrangements are too weak to circumvent commitment problems directly,
then, as formalized by the literature on repeated games, repeated interactions provide an al-
ternative way to circumvent such problems. In the context of political economy, de Figueiredo
(2002) provides a fully fledged, formal analysis of the conditions under which such repeated in-
teractions circumvent commitment problems in a political economy. His framework is especially
well suited to study commitment in the regulatory context of this paper, because it studies a
16Moe (1990, p245) notes that ”the fact is that new governments do not take office and begin demolishing the
existing bureaucracy. The vast bulk of government seems pretty safe from this sort of thing.” Yet, the empirical
analysis of Gilardi (2002, 2005) reveals that this delegation is often far from perfect.
17In the explicit context of regulation see also Spulber and Besanko (1992) and Calvert, McCubbins, and
Weingast (1989).
18Case, C-424/07 European Commission v. Germany, Judgment of 3 December 2009.
19See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62007C0424:EN:HTML.
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model in which the parties’ payoff functions are single peaked and concave with respect to a
one–dimensional policy variable.
Political Bargaining
The formal analysis characterizes Pareto optimal pre-electoral agreements and shows that they
imply a complete elimination of regulatory risk. Under efficient bargaining political parties will
reach an efficient agreement and, hence, agree to institutionalize an independent regulatory
agency. The set of mutually beneficial agreements is generally however not a singleton. This
raises the question on which of these agreements the political parties agree. This question
is nontrivial, because within the set of mutually beneficial agreements A∗, the two political
parties have diverging preferences. For instance, party l prefers values close to α∗r whereas
party r prefers values close to α∗l . It then depends on the relative bargaining strengths and the
specific bargaining procedure which kind of politically independent agency αa ∈ A
∗ the parties
will institutionalize.
When bargaining is inefficient, political parties will only reach an agreement if the benefits
from the agreement outweigh the bargaining costs. Especially when empirically testing the
theoretical implications of the model, it is important to point out that bargaining costs limit
the applicability of some of the results. In particular, when there is little political divergence, the
gains from pre-electoral agreements is small so that negotiations may not outweigh bargaining
costs. The discussion of the regulatory overhaul of the US Postal System in Section 8 however
indicates that, in practise, political parties do manage to reach such agreements when the
potential gains are high.
Because monetary side payments seem inappropriate in a political economy context, the
analysis concentrated on a setup where political parties are unable to use direct side payments
to facilitate bargaining. If one allows such side payments then efficient bargaining leads to
a regulation on the basis of a regulatory variable α∗lr that maximizes the common surplus
Ŵlr(α) ≡ Ŵl(α) + Ŵh(α). It is straightforward to see that the common surplus function is
equivalent to twice the surplus function Ŵp(α) that obtains from an individual party p with
the weight αp = (αl + αr)/2. It is then immediate that α
∗
lr = (αl + αr)/2. The possibility of
side payments, therefore, strengthens the positive result that political parties have an incentive
to eliminate the regulatory risk, because it follows, by Lemma 1, that the common surplus
function has a unique maximum.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: From (3) it follows
v′′(x̂h)∂x̂h/∂α = −ψ∆c
so that v′′ < 0 implies ∂x̂h/∂α > 0. Since ∂Ŵp/∂α = ∂W̃p/∂xh∂x̂h/∂α, the sign of Ŵ
′
p(α),
therefore, coincides with the sign of ∂W̃p/∂xh. Note that
∂W̃p
∂xh
= −ν(1 − αp)∆c+ (1− ν)(v
′(x̂h)− ch) = −ν(1 − αp)∆c+ (1− ν)(ψ∆c) = (αp − α)∆c.
Hence, ∂W̃p/∂xh and, therefore, Ŵ
′
p is positive for α < αp and negative for α > αp. This
shows that Ŵp(α) is increasing for α < αp and decreasing for α > αp. Consequently, Ŵp
attains a unique maximum at αp. Because Ŵp is twice differentiable it holds Ŵ
′
p(αp) = 0 and
Ŵ ′′p (αp) < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: The function Ŵp(α) is concave around α if Ŵp(α) is concave with respect
to some interval [α, α] around α. A sufficient condition for this is that Ŵ ′′p (α) < 0.
It follows
Ŵp(α) = ν[v(x̂l)− clx̂l − (1− αp)∆cx̂h(α)] + (1− ν)[v(x̂h(α))− chx̂h(α)].
Using (3), differentiation of Wp(.) yields
Ŵ ′p(α) = −ν(1 − αp)∆cx̂
′




= −ν(1 − αp)∆cx̂
′
h(α) + (1− ν)(1− α)ψ∆cx̂
′
h(α).
Using the definition of ψ and (4), a further differentiation of Wp(.) yields
Ŵ ′′p (α) = [−ν(1 − αp)∆cx̂
′′

























Proof of Proposition 2: For the special case where demand is convex (v′′′ > 0) it follows, for
any α ∈ (αl, αr), that (αl − α)ψ∆cv
′′′(x) < 0 < (v′′(x))2. Hence, inequality (8) is satisfied so
that Ŵl(α) is concave and, therefore, W̃
e
l is smaller than Ŵl((1−π)αr+παl) for any π ∈ (0, 1).
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For the special case where demand is concave (v′′′ < 0), it follows, for any α ∈ (αl, αr), that
(αr − α)ψ∆cv
′′′(x) < 0 < (v′′(x))2. Hence, inequality (8) is satisfied so that Ŵr(α) is concave
and, therefore, W̃ er is smaller than Ŵr((1− π)αr + παl) for any π ∈ (0, 1).
Linear demand case (v′′′ = 0) implies x̂eh = x̂h(αe). I showed that, for this case, both party
r and party l dislike regulatory risk. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: I first prove the second part of the Proposition. It follows
W er − Ŵr(αe) = (1− π)Ŵr(αr) + πŴr(αl)− Ŵr(αe)
= (1− π)W̃r(x̂l, x̂h(αr)) + πW̃r(x̂l, x̂h(αl))− W̃r(x̂l, x̂h(αe))
=
[




















Due to v′′ < 0, the first term in squared brackets is negative. The second term in square
brackets is non–positive, because x̂eh ≤ xh(αe) < x̂h(αr) and ∂W̃r/∂xh > 0 for xh < xh(αr)
imply W̃r(x̂l, x̂
e
h) ≤ W̃r(x̂l, x̂h(αe). As a result the overall expression is negative and, therefore,
party r dislikes regulatory risk.
Similarly for party l, it follows










Due to v′′ < 0, the first term in squared brackets is negative. The second term in square
brackets is non–positive, because x̂eh ≥ xh(αe) > x̂h(αl) and ∂W̃l/∂xh < 0 for xh < xh(αl)
imply W̃l(x̂l, x̂
e
h) ≤ W̃l(x̂l, x̂h(αe). As a result the overall expression is negative and, therefore,
party l dislikes regulatory risk.
Hence, if party l likes regulatory risk then, necessarily, x̂eh < x̂h(αe), but party r then dislikes
regulatory risk. Similarly, if party r likes regulatory risk then x̂eh > x̂h(αe), but party l then
dislikes regulatory risk. Hence, if some party likes risk then the other party dislikes it. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: From (8) it follows that Ŵp(α) is concave for the range [αl, αr]
whenever |αp − α|ψ∆c < [v
′′(x̂h(α))]
2/|v′′′(x̂h(α))|. Because for this range |αp − α| < ∆α, (9)
implies that a sufficient condition for the concavity over this range is ∆αψ∆c < v̄. Comparative
static results i), iii) , iv) then follow directly from this condition.
In order to demonstrate ii), first suppose party l is a regulatory risk averse party. Because
Wr(αr) > Wr(αl), the expression W
e




























because Ŵ ′r(αr) = 0. Because Ŵr(αe(1)) = W
e
r (1), it then follows that Ŵr(αe(π)) > W
e
r (π) for
(1− π) < 1 but close enough to 1.
If party l is not a regulatory risk averse party, then, by Proposition 3, party r is regulatory
risk averse. By a similar argument, one can then show that dŴl(αe(0))/dπ = 0. BecauseW
e
l (π)
is strictly increasing in (1 − π), it then follows that Ŵl(αe(π)) > W
e
l (π) for (1 − π) > 0 but
close enough to 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5 : Follows directly from the text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6 : Follows directly from the text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose, by contradiction, that α̂l > α̂r is a Nash equilibrium. It must
then hold that α̂l > αl or α̂
r < αr. Suppose α̂





l|α̂r). Hence, α̂l is not a best reply to α̂r, because already αl = α̂r yields
party l more. By a similar argument, α̂r does not maximize Wr(α
r|α̂l) if α̂r < αr.
Next, suppose, by contradiction, that α̂l = α̂r is a Nash equilibrium. It must then hold
that α̂l 6= αl or α̂
r 6= αr. The case α̂
l 6= αl does not represent a Nash equilibrium because it
would then followWl(αl|α
r) = π(αl, α
r)Ŵl(αl)+(1−π(αl, α
r))Ŵl(α̂







l|αr) so that αl yields party l strictly more than α̂
l = α̂r.
Likewise, the case α̂l 6= αl does not represent a Nash equilibrium because αr would yield party
r strictly more that α̂r = α̂l.
Suppose, by contradiction, that α̂l < α̂r ≤ αl is a Nash equilibrium. In this case it follows
Wl(α̂
r|α̂r) > Wl(α̂
l|α̂r) so that α̂l < αr is not a best reply against α̂r ≤ αl. Likewise, α̂
r > α̂l ≥
αr cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
For any Nash equilibrium it therefore holds αl ≤ α̂
l < α̂r ≤ αr so that the payoff functions
of party l and r simplify to, respectively,
Wl(α










Finally, evaluating the derivative of the payoff function of party p with respect to αp at αp = αp
reveals that a Nash equilibrium cannot exhibit αp = αp. Q.E.D.
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